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Six Principles for Governing Mobile Platforms
Julia Manner, David Nienaber, Michael Schermann, and Helmut Krcmar
Technische Universität München, Chair for Information Systems, Garching by Munich,
Germany
{Julia.Manner,david.nienaber,michael.schermann,krcmar}@in.tum.de

Abstract. Mobile platforms enable third-parties to extend and enhance functionalities of products and services by mediating these to consumers. A tremendously successful example is Apple’s App Store where third-party developers
contribute applications that add to the usefulness of the mobile device. However, research and practice still struggle with understanding why and when such
mobile platforms prosper or wither. In this paper, we develop a framework to
study how companies use governance mechanisms to attract customers and
third-party developers. We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework by analyzing how governance mechanisms were used to change the interaction of
platform, customers, and third-party developers. We derive six principles for
governing mobile platforms that highlight the need to further investigate how
governance mechanisms align the value propositions to platform operator, customers and third-party developers.
Keywords: mobile platforms, governance, controls, services

1

Introduction

Enabling third-party developers to add functionalities to a core product by providing a
mediating mobile platform is an increasingly popular model to raise earnings and
enhance customer satisfaction [1-3]. Mobile platforms are also known as App Stores
providing a development and marketplace environment.
However, many companies struggle to provide a sustainable and thriving mediating platform. This challenge is illustrated by the fact that 97 percent of the mobile
services market share is held by only seven platforms, despite the fact that 40 to 50
platforms exist [4]. As platforms are affected by network effects, the success of a
platform is determined by having enough participants on the development side to
attract the customer side and vice versa. These stakeholder interests need to be
aligned by governance [5-6].
The struggle with platform success in practice highlights the complexity of mobile
platform governance and reflects the immaturity of practical understanding and research on platform governance [7-9]. In particular, we observe that in practice platform providers use imitation strategies rather than developing a proactive governance
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concept [10]. Yet, imitation ignores the fact that platform governance needs to fit to
the ecosystem of the platform which is never identical across platforms [4], [11].
In this paper, we triangulate results from heterogeneous background - a previous
literature review, a basic governance concept for platforms and real world example to posit initial principles for using governance to align the value propositions for platform operator, customers, and third-party developers. We thereby contribute to research on the important topic of mobile platforms by developing a theoretical framework that helps to study how companies use governance mechanisms to become attractive to customers and third-party developers. The usefulness of our framework
will be demonstrated by analyzing how governance mechanisms were used to change
the interaction of platform customers and third-party providers. In conclusion, we
derive six principles for governing mobile platforms that highlight the need to further
investigate how governance mechanisms align stakeholder interests.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we discuss the literature
on platform governance identified in the literature review of Manner et al. [8]. Based
upon this, we adapt the basic concept of platform governance proposed by Manner et
al. [8] to provide a practically applicable platform governance framework to study and
classify the use of governance mechanisms in the mobile platforms of Apple, Google
and Microsoft. We compile evidence from the field with literature to propose initial
principles for using governance mechanisms to align the value propositions to platform provider, customers and third-party developers. Finally, we discuss our findings
and conclude with an outlook on future research opportunities.

2

Theoretical Background

2.1

A Definition of Mobile Platform Governance

In this paper, we focus on mobile platforms such as Apple’s App Store with twomarket sides: the developer environment and the buying environment. Mobile platforms like Apple’s App Store are socio-economic layered, consisting of an IT-based
artifact which enables external knowledge holders to contribute functionality to a core
product [7], [12]. In this way, platform providers are mediating the process of adding
functionality to the IT-based marketplace and therefore to the consumers to gain further economic value; for example, by extracting revenue from transaction and to
achieve their strategic aim.
Aside from platform providers, there are two major stakeholders to be considered
in a platform ecosystem: developers and consumers. They are part of the definition of
platform ecosystems as a functional unit consisting of the platform provider, developers, consumers as well as strategic partners of the platform provider [13-14]. The
integration of third-party developers into the value creating process is a challenging
concept. A platform provider needs to establish regulating guidelines, documentations
and rules to enable and guide developers which assist them in creating compatible
applications to extend the core product [9]. On the one hand, developers need support
to be able to create functionality as well as creative freedom to be innovative [15]. On
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the other hand, the platform provider must maintain control and prevent developers to
bypass the platform, building a direct developer consumer relationship. Thereby, providers lose their possibility to integrate their strategic aims like a specific customer
experience and gaining money from the platform [13], [16].
The regulating framework to shape a viable and sustainable platform is known as
platform governance. It provides structures to manage the stakeholder relationships
[17], determines the allocation and distribution of power for actions [18] and controls
the actions of the platform stakeholders [19]. Hence, platform governance is defined
as “the structure, power, processes, and control mechanisms that are applied by the
platform owner to achieve his aims” [8].
2.2

Theories Related to Mobile Platform Governance

The key element to a viable platform is the balance of its ecosystem by sound platform governance [7], [11], [20]. It is a multi-dimensional concept that links the technical architecture of a platform with the ecosystem, and the platform provider’s power. Hence, studying mobile platforms demands the investigation of technical, organizational and financial aspects [21].
Since the concept of platform governance touches many different disciplines, the
existing knowledge of governance is very fragmented [7], [10]. Many researchers in
the fields of economics, strategic management and organizational science have examined aspects of platform governance corresponding to their discipline [8], [11]. Information systems research now combines some of this fragmented work originating
from its reference disciplines [8], [22].
Economics was one of the first research disciplines to study the underlying concept
of platforms: pricing in two- and multi-sided markets [5-6]. They discuss pricing
mechanisms for platforms and price elasticity in the competitive ecosystem of dynamic systems [6], [17], [23]. Still, research in this field provides little managerial implications for platform providers and governance [7]. Strategic management literature
regards the role of platforms as complementary markets [3], [24], starting a broad
discussion about “how open is open enough” [25], observing the field in a practical
way and explaining the past [14], but not providing process implications for practitioners. Organizational science literature addresses platform governance from a control perspective [26]. Controls are considered a powerful instrument to synchronize
activities [27] and to “assure ongoing alignment between their investment in the
community and related product goals” [28].
Across all streams of literature, there is consensus that successful platform governance fits to the ecosystem of a platform and thus cannot be easily imitated [7], [9].
Hence, actively developing distinct platform governance mechanisms that fit to the
platform ecosystem might be a solution [7]. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of
platform governance, its elements and how they are linked together is necessary.
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3

A Comprehensive View on Mobile Platform Governance

In this chapter, we discuss the elements of platform governance derived from literature and their links to each other, building a comprehensive view on mobile platform
governance based on the findings of Manner et al. [8]. Figure 1 illustrates the three
levels of the platform governance framework. The top level is the market structure,
the second level is the governance policies and the bottom level is the governance
configuration. Taking this perspective, we begin to elaborate on the elements of governance and its implications.

Fig. 1. Top level governance framework [8]

3.1

Market Structure

The value propositions of a platform depend on the congruence of the platform with a
dynamic market structure [4], [11]. The discipline of marketing defines the market
structure as the macro-ecosystem of the platform [29]. Thus, a fit between platform
governance and the ecosystem is vital for platform success [7]. As an example, software providers “are constantly evolving, increasing their depth and/or reach and in the
process redefining their boundaries”, which stresses the importance of ecosystem
alignment [1], [30]. Following a similar line of arguments, de Reuver et al. [31] suggest important triggers that describe a dynamic market structure, such as the emergence of new technologies, regulatory changes, or competitive changes from changing consumer behavior or behavior of competitors. These dynamics in the market
structure require to constantly realign the value propositions of platform operators,
customers, and third-party developers [2], [6]. Consolidating literature on classical
market structures [29] and electronic markets [32], we condense the following triggers of a market structure for mobile platforms. These triggers constitute important
cues to the platform operator when formulating the objectives and the strategy along
with the business model [32]: Legal triggers describe events originating from legislation, government agencies, or jurisprudence that affect the platform, e.g., restrictions
to access user data [8]. Technical triggers originate from technical progress, e.g. the
increasing availability of fourth generation broadband Internet access. Also precommercial developments have to be taken into account as they may have significant
impact on the design of a platform [4], [16]. Socio-economic triggers refer to economic events and actions that also influence social reality, for example the increasing
awareness for privacy issues in society [4], [7], [32]. Competitive triggers originate
from changes in the competitor’s behavior. For instance, such triggers comprise of
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strategic moves of competitors that shift competition advantages between market
actors [7], [19]. Stakeholder triggers refer to actions of customers, third-party developers or other strategic partners of the platform operator. To give an example, developers who are disgruntled by poor technical support, might switch to competing platforms. Changes in customer behavior are also important triggers [11], [21], [31].
3.2

Governance Policies

The next task is the transition from ecosystem to governance, which is a sub form of
the market structure [33]. This is achieved by the formulation of policies. We define
policies as an organizing logic which is derived from the market structure. Heading
up, we assessed the basement of literature identified by Manner et al. [8]. Thereby, we
observed a variety of issues which lead to seven policy sections. These aim at resolving particular questions.
Standardization policy: To what extent shall the platform be standardized? This
implies a trade-off, considering that a too high degree of standardization means poor
usability for developers but assures flexibility to adapt to ecosystem changes [18].
The interaction between different functionalities can be supported by standardization
which can deliver an added value by complementary use. However, innovation can be
hampered. Ensuring usability is a further trade-off for platform providers. Ease of use
is supported by a uniform interaction design but it demands high and expensive control efforts. These rules aim at aligning features, services and platform experience.
Providing a new API or SDK sets a standard as well as implementing a new section
within a marketplace.
Incentive policy: How are the platform stakeholders incentivized, especially developers? Users as well as developers need to adapt to the platform. It is not well
known what really motivates developers to develop for a certain platform. According
to Holzner et al. [15], financial aspects, prestige and creative freedom are important
incentives for developers. Providing creative freedom contradicts to the user’s demand of ease of use and compatibility of functionality. The design of the incentive
policy must therefore be balanced with the standardization policy. Many other examples exist. Yet, they pose interdependencies to other policies [7], [15]. Incentives can
be either positive like new incentive programs or negative when a previously implemented incentive is withdrawn by the provider.
Legal policy: Who is allowed to use, change, transfer and benefit from the platform and its facilities? Property rights for apps could remain with the developer, but
could also be transferred to the provider. This issue may be addressed – for example –
by shared income and licenses [19]. With increasing access to the core product by
applications of third-parties, new legal issues arise.
Quality of Service policy: Which quality of service is offered to the customer?
Quality is an important aspect for platforms regulated by governance [33]. This topic
addresses issues of functionality, availability, performance and perceived service
quality from the viewpoint of service consumers [21], [34].
Distribution policy: How are services, support and tools distributed by the platform? Making content accessible in the right way to the customers is vital for custom-
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er satisfaction and service usability. Developers have to be provided with the latest
SDK and processes for application integration have to be implemented [19]. In general, the whole value network from developer to service consumer is covered. There
are also different ways to enable customers to access the offering. For instance, Android customers can choose between several distribution platforms, but Apple customers must use Apple’s App Store or install illegal software applications like Cydia
[12], [34].
Finance policy: How is revenue generated and how are the financial aspects organized on the platform? More important is the share of profit between the platform
stakeholders [21]. Customers need to pay reasonable prices for their added functionalities. Developers need to make stimulating profits or they will not continue developing for the platform. A platform provider needs to skim enough off the platform revenue streams to be able to continue offering and nurturing the platform. Detailed aspects are the right to set prices on applications, discretization of prices and entry fees
for developers [18-19], [21].
Security policy: What security standards have to be implemented? This refers to
data, communication and distribution security, access to personal user data and similar aspects [16], [18-19]. The platform provider decides what APIs are offered and
thereby which access the third-party applications are allowed to the device. The more
APIs are offered, the more functionality can be built. On the downside, possibilities
for security gaps that need to be controlled increase in number. The security policy
also ensures the authentication process and determines the authorization of third-party
applications and users.
The goal is to align policies perfectly to the market structure [7], [35]. The five core
papers on platform governance, identified by Manner et al. [8] revert to more than
twenty different aspects, which have to be resolved in a platform context. These all
can be categorized into the above mentioned policies. Based on literature, we believe
that a main challenge on this governance level is to find the correct fit between these
policies [7]. For example, the more technical support (quality of service policy) is
provided to the developers, the more skilled they get. Thus, the platform provider can
grant skilled developers a higher degree of design clearance, which stimulates them
positively (incentive policy). But a too high degree could infringe the platform, when
allowing too much access to programming interfaces and other means of the standardization policy. The implementation of low admittance criteria for developers to foster
immigration (incentive policy) is another aspect. But to keep the desired quality-ofservice, one has to adapt the technical support to the needs of unskilled developers.
All interdependencies are of a varying nature and must be analyzed in the specific
context. The policies defined here provide view of issues every platform has to consider.
3.3

Governance Configuration

The constituted governance policies must be implemented to manage consumer experience and to align with stakeholder objectives [20]. Platform operators need to
choose from a plethora of formal and informal mechanisms to implement their gov-

1380

ernance policies [16]. Every mechanism can be described from a governance perspective as well as from a control perspective [7], [18].
De Reuver and Bouwman [18] classify governance mechanisms into three notmutually exclusive categories: Authority-based governance mechanisms employ
the platform provider’s power to enforce behavior as desired using policies. Contract-based governance mechanisms refer to legally binding agreements, whereas
trust-based governance mechanisms are based on the assumption that the target
group has strong incentives to reach the desired goal and levers these incentives [18].
Control mechanisms inform the platform operator about the extent to which the
governance mechanisms are effective and efficient. Originally, Ouchi [36] defined
three different types of control mechanism: outcome, behavior and social control.
They all aim at achieving coordination between parties with different intentions and
goals in organizations. Kirsch [37] expanded social control through self-control.
Thereby, she distinguishes between group and individual level. Cardinal et al. [38]
adds input control where meeting desired inputs such as employee skills to an objective are appreciated. However, we differentiate the following control mechanisms:
Input control mechanisms define required characteristics of provided input, e.g.
developers and apps. Meeting these characteristics is rewarded. An output control
mechanism sets a desired output. Again, reaching such goals is rewarded. Behavior
control provides procedures and routines to reach a goal, where compliance with the
procedures and routines is rewarded. Social control mechanisms strengthen common
values and shared beliefs. People acting according to these are rewarded by social
acceptance to the system. Such a control is implemented by rewarding behavior that
has a “substantially overlap” with the interests of the subject under control [36], e.g.
developers that code in a certain style are rewarded by thorough feedback on their
code.
Output and behavior control are formal mechanisms, whereas input and social control are informal mechanisms. According to previous findings, control is implemented
by a mixture of control mechanisms [36-37]. Applying the right balance of each control mode is essential [39].
3.4

A Framework for Mobile Platform Governance

We have three levels to consider when designing a platform governance concept. The
first level is the market structure giving an overview of the platform’s current situation which is influenced by legal, technical, socio-economic, competition and stakeholder behavior aspects. Changes to these imply an adaption of the present governance concept. Therefore, it resembles the starting point for the development of sound
governance.
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Table 1. Governance Framework: Important elements and corresponding levels.
Market
Structure
Governance
Policy

Factors
Policies

Governance
Governance Mechanisms
Configuration Control
Mechanisms

Level Aspects
Stakeholder
SocioCompetition
Legal
Technical
Economic
Behavior
StandardQuality of
Incentive Legal
Distribution Finance Security
ization
Service
Authority- Contract- Trustbased
based
based
Input

Outcome

Behavior

Social

On the second level, governance policies are derived to implement the business strategy in conformance with the market structure and to achieve corresponding goals. At
the bottom layer, governance mechanisms implement the policies from a means point
of view, focusing on its characteristics, whereas controls focus on targets, mainly
specific stakeholders and their behavior. Table 1 aggregates the critical issues of platform governance into a morphological framework.

4

Insights from Changes in Governance Concepts

In order to understand the effectiveness of governance concepts, we analyzed three
governance changes from different platform providers: Apple, Android, and Microsoft. The goal of the multiple change analysis was to find out, if the framework is
applicable for governance change analysis and findings on how successful platforms
are governed. Apple’s App Store and Google’s Google Play mobile platforms have
often been described in research as completely different (closed vs. open). Therefore,
they are suitable platforms to gain insights. We also chose the Windows Phone Store
in contrast to the two mobile platform leaders Apple and Google [34]. At present,
Microsoft battles with establishing a developer and consumer base rather than base
extension. The chosen cases are suitable to demonstrate the framework applicability
and to provide further insights as they provide a wide variety.
4.1

Governance Changes in the Apple Platform

Earlier this year, Apple made a significant privacy change. This was triggered by a
broad discussion in politics and society overall (socio-economic and stakeholder
behavior trigger) about the unauthorized extraction of personal data like the address
book by application providers. Apple may have feared that the discussion could start
to unsettle users and make them more reluctant to buy applications. Then, the attractiveness of the platform for users would have additionally suffered.
In consequence, Apple used its power as platform provider and applied an adapted
security policy prohibiting unauthorized access via applications without prior asking
for access to secure the trust of its mobile device customers.
To enforce the security policy Apple changed from a contract-based governance
mechanism, which only prohibited the unauthorized access in the guidelines, to au-
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thority-based governance. Previously, although it was forbidden to access the data, it
was not controlled, whether the application recorded data without permission. This
means it was social control (informal). The new control consists of a mixture of
input and behavior control. The implemented input control mechanisms are a
change in the SDK and the release of a new operating system (authority-based),
whereas contracts remained as behavioral control steering the developers behavior
(contract-based) [40]. In this real world change, we find two principles applied. It
presents a formal input control supported by an informal behavioral control presenting
a control mix. Since Apple aimed to limit uncertainty by generating new trust of
users in Apple who otherwise would have left the platform, we also find high mechanism strength that is proactively implemented, as there was no lawsuit or law at the
moment of change.
4.2

Governance Changes in the Android Platform

The second example analyzes Google’s change of their platform governance concept
regarding the Android billing system. Google had installed a contract-based mechanism controlled by social control to make developers use Google’s in-app billing
system for in-app purchases. However, Google recognized that more and more developers circumvent Google’s in-app billing system.
Due to this fact, consumers were confronted with different billing systems, which
negatively influenced their experience and Google’s revenue. This omitting behavior
of the developers as stakeholders triggered a governance change. Android changed
the approval process regarding in-app billing. Google established its own billing system, implementing an authority-based governance mechanism via an adapted standardization policy. This policy change is controlled by an adapted approval process.
The approval process, as a form of output control, now rejects any applications infringing this rule [41]. We identify that governance changes trigger control changes in
the same direction. More strict governance leads to a formal strict control. Therefore,
we derive a congruency between governance and control.
4.3

Governance Changes in the Windows Platform

The last case deals about the Windows Phone Store. Being a new entrant with already two major competitors like Android and Apple, Windows needed to catch up
with the amount of application offerings. Only few developers worked for Windows
Phone due to the lack of advantages they saw in providing their applications for
Microsofts’ small consumer base [15]. Microsoft needed to establish a relationship to
potential application developers to gain a certain amount of developers providing
innovative and various applications to also attract consumers.
Hence, trust-based governance in the form of a new incentive policy for developers was introduced. By providing free phones for developers, promising visibility
of their apps as well as advance payment, money and prestige was given as incentive.
From a control perspective, Microsoft also implemented an informal social control.
By providing these incentives they reached a substantially overlap between the devel-
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opers’ interests and its Windows Phone Store [36], [42]. In this real word example,
we observe two principles. Firstly, the Windows Phone platform implemented proactively the incentive policy to achieve more participants. Secondly, the governance and
control mechanisms were implemented congruently as a light governance mechanism
is supported by a light informal control.

5

Six Principles for Governing Mobile Platforms

Principles for governing mobile platforms have not yet been suggested in literature.
We therefore propose to derive principles for governing mobile platforms based on
our framework, evaluated literature and real world examples of governance changes.
The suggested principles are reflected between these sources and identified in at least
two of them to achieve more robust results [43].They are summarized in Table 2.
We argued that all three governance levels (market structure, governance policies
and the governance configuration) are important. Each governance level sheds light
on different aspects that need to be considered when deriving platform governance.
Thus, we propose “consider every governance level” as the first governance principle.
The next topic to be considered is the dynamic nature of the ecosystem of the platform. To be viable, platform owners need to quickly react to changes in the ecosystem
[7]. This requires an ongoing evaluation and anticipation of changes and their impacts
to the market structure. Platforms should constantly adapt their governance and learn
from these changes. Our second governance principal is therefore: “Use proactivity to
ensure viability”.
The direct link between the market structure and the governance policies implies
the need to align both levels. We argue that mechanisms are the means to enforce
policies. Thus, changing policies always trigger a subsequent change in the governance configuration. Therefore, we propose the third and the fourth governance principle “Adapt policies to changes in the market structure” and “Constantly align governance and control mechanisms”.
Platform providers differentiate primary and secondary objectives, e.g. being profitable or establishing a large user base [2], [15]. Primary objectives need to be enforced by authority-based governance and formal control to ensure their pursuit. Secondary objectives are mainly supported by trust-based and informal control. Thus, our
fifth governance principle is: “Enforce primary objectives through authority-based
governance and formal control”. Yet, control modes are implemented by a mixture of
controls, where formal controls are the main part, aided by informal instantiations
[37]. Applying the right fraction of each is essential. Our sixth governance principle is
therefore: “Aid formal control with the right amount of informal control”.
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Explanation

Rationale

Congruency
Complete
Proactivity
I
Use

#

Platform providers should think through
all three governance levels to structure
their governance decision process and
evaluate the impact of the change.
Anticipate changes in the ecosystem to
be ahead of your competitors and thus
ensure competitive advantage and
success.

Governance can be divided into three abstract and L, FW,
interdependent levels. All of them have to be consid- RW
ered when implementing governance as each has
significant implications on the platform.
Governance is about the alignment with the ecosys- L, RW
tem. Anticipating changes enable to adapt faster than
your competitors.

Governance policies need to be aligned
with the market structure to guarantee
the correct implementation of governance and control mechanisms

Mechanism Congruency
strength
II

Table 2. Six principles for governing mobile platforms from a provider’s perspective
Princi-

Source*

Governance and control mechanisms
have to be aligned with the policies to
ensure correct implementation of the
strategic aims

Governance policies contain implementation guide- FW, RW
lines. Implementing the right strategy is vital for
platform success. Thus, the correct alignment of
market structure and policies is a precondition to
provide a thriving platform.
Governance and control mechanisms are the means FW, RW
through which the platform provider takes action.
After formulating the correct strategy in the policies,
its manifestation in tangible mechanisms is essential
to ensure platform enforcement.
Platform providers need to meet primary goals to be RW, L
successful. Mechanisms which ensure the fulfillment
of the goals are necessary. Relying on trust and good
will is not a viable option.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Control mix

ple

When pursuing a primary business
objective, providers should only use
authority-based governance and formal
control (and no other means)

Formal controls to ensure primary Primary goals should not be enforced by informal RW, L
objectives should be aided by informal controls as they are essential and fulfillment should
controls.
not be exposed to uncertainty. Consequently, formal
controls are required. To ensure that primary goals
are reached, further aid is necessary to limit uncertainty by adding extra informal controls.

*Source: L - Literature on platform governance; FW - Governance framework; RW - Real-world Examples

6

Discussion

Research on platform governance is fragmented [7], [9]. As many companies fail in
providing a thriving platform by aligning stakeholder interests in real world, we argue
that platform governance research could advance understanding of why some mobile
platforms prosper and others wither. Although research on platforms and governance
is increasing, there are little empirical insights on this complex concept to this point.
When a complex phenomenon is studied, a triangulation of sources is especially appropriate since it contributes to the robustness of results and a more complete understanding [43]. Therefore, we combined insights from literature qualitatively, reflecting these on a previously developed framework and deriving insight from real world
examples.
We adapted a basic mobile platform governance concept provided by Manner et al.
[8]. Unlike its predecessor, the framework combines the elements together and
provides classification characteristics within each level making it applicable for real
word governance change analysis. The final framework structures platform governance into three distinct levels, the market structure, governance policies and the governance configuration as well as provides classification characteristics within the

1385

level, enabling platform providers to structure their decision. Moreover, we analyzed
three real world governance changes demonstrating the applicability and usefulness of
the framework to analyze and understand governance.
To support the framework with guidance, we proposed six principles for governing
mobile platforms which are based on literature findings, elements of our framework
and three real world governance changes. Each principle was derived from at least
two of these three sources. Hence, we claim to have proposed robust findings.
The first principle complete use was found in literature, derived from the framework and within each real word example as we were able to fully apply the framework. In fact, we could also find the proactivity principle proposed by literature as it
is reflected in all presented governance changes. Every store actively initiated a
change without being forced by for example law or bankruptcy.
The third principle of congruency I between market influence factor and the governance policy is validated by the fact that a market influence factor triggering the
governance policy change was identified within each change. The fourth principle
congruency II, which proposes the alignment between governance and control, is
reflected by the Windows Phone Store change where the implementation of a light
governance mechanism is supported by a light informal control. The counterexample
is provided by Google Play presenting the implementation of strict governance that
leads to a formal strict control which in the end results in a high validity of this principle. Ensuring the enforcement with mechanisms is especially important when business interests are depending. Apple’s interest not to lose trust of market participants
was undeniably strong. Analyzing the change and detecting strong mechanisms supports and validates the literature derived principle of mechanism strength on the condition of business objectives. At last, literature is proposing that control mechanisms
do not occur mutually exclusive. Evidence on our proposed principle of control mix
was also found in reality where an input as well as behavioral control was applied by
Apple’s App Store.
Altogether, we were able to supply reliable verification for each principle. Furthermore, the principles were reflected and rationally analyzed to provide quality
control. Our real world examples clearly support the claim that governance needs to
be designed carefully. A fitting governance concept can only be designed for one
certain platform, not for several and even such a concept does only fit until it needs to
be adapted to the ecosystem again [7], [9], [11].
Our findings propose the first support for platform providers to develop governance rather than imitate as the framework proposes a structured way to analyze governance changes and enables to identify more easily what consequences a change
could cause. Hence, it enables a well-structured decision. As the principles were derived from the three big players in the mobile service market, they will help practitioners to provide a thriving platform when combined with the presented framework.
However, to this point the framework and the principles do not support the development of governance for a new platform or advise what governance policies should be
adapted on the platform when for example a new competitor enters the market. Moreover, at the moment, the principles are of general nature that need to be analyzed
more intensely in detail by future research and there may be more factors in real
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world considered by practitioners that are not yet implemented in the framework and
the principles derived from literature.
We acknowledge several limitations of our work. First of all, our framework is for
the most part based on a literature review provided by Manner et al. [8]. Furthermore,
although our examples provide a wide range as we chose three different platforms to
prove the applicability of the framework, more changes should be looked at. Finally,
our examples only observe changes from a secondary source. Interviews with the
platform providers questioning their motives could provide more insights

7

Conclusion and Future Research

We analyzed the literature, proposed applicable mobile platform governance framework and applied the framework to analyze multiple governance change examples.
Six principles for governing mobile platforms were derived from the framework, real
world and literature insights.
Providing such a structured view on the multi-dimensional concept of governance
based on research findings of several disciplines, builds a more mature view on platform governance and is a valuable contribution to research and practice.
However, we believe future empirical research could enlarge the proposed mechanisms. For example, we believe a legal factor, triggering changes, has to be integrated
by contract- or authority-based governance mechanisms as well as by formal controls
rather than by trust-based mechanisms and informal controls. As shown in the examples, governance policies can be ignored by stakeholders if not enforced by the right
tangible mechanisms. Implementing weak governance, although a legal framework
does exist, is to others an opportunity for a lawsuit claim.
A cross-case study analyzing a large amount of governance changes would be an
adequate method for finally evaluating the framework and enlarging the governance
principles. Interviews with platform providers would contribute to this research and
enable to build a platform theory [43].
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